Search Friction and Job Destruction under Decreasing Marginal Return Technology by Nosaka Hiromi & 野坂 博南
Search Friction and Job Destruction under
Decreasing Marginal Return Technology
著者 Nosaka Hiromi
journal or
publication title
Kansai University review of economics
volume 10
page range 1-23
year 2008-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10112/12267
Kansai University Review of Economics 
No. 10 (March 2008), pp. 1-23 
Search Friction and Job Destruction under 
Decreasing Marginal Return Technology 
Hiromi Nosaka*t 
This paper considers the role of job destruction in a job 
search model where firms have decreasing marginal return 
technology and workers are heterogeneous. Because the 
bargaining solution developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) 
and Smith (1999) is employed, firms have an incentive to 
overemploy workers so as to reduce the workers'bargaining 
position. This creates a discrepancy between the two 
efficiency conditions: namely, job creation and job destruction. 
Consequently, any equilibrium is unable to attain an efficient 
allocation when heterogeneous workers exist within a firm. 
Keywords: search frictions, bargaining, heterogeneous workers 
1 Introduction 
Search frictions are considered to play important roles in 
characterizing labor markets (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). 
Although the literature has been successful in understanding many 
stylized facts of the dynamics of unemployment (Merz, 1995; Andolfatto, 
1996; Cooley and Quadrini, 1999; Den Haan et al., 2000; Walsh, 2003; 
Trigari, 2004), firm structure as modeled had been portrayed as 
relatively simple until recently in the sense that there is no interaction 
between workers within a firm. This is because most models assume 
that a firm employs up to only one worker. 
Pissarides (2000) and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) showed that this 
assumption is not restrictive, when the firm uses constant returns-to-
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?scale technology with respect to labor (L) and capital (K) and where 
capital can be adjusted freely in the competitive capital market. In this 
case, production is expressed as Y=F(K,L)=F(k, 1) L, where the capital 
labor ratio, k, depends only on the market rental rate of capital.1 Then, 
due to the linearity of the technology, one firm employing L workers is 
equivalent to L firms, each of which employs one worker.2 Although this 
type of model is simple and tractable, it omits many of the more important 
interactions within the firm. For example, when there are adjustment 
costs in changing capital, the marginal product of labor is a decreasing 
function of labor input in the short run. Another example is the case of 
the monopolistic competition, where marginal revenue is decreasing in 
labor input (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987; Rotemberg, 2006; Krause 
and Lubik, 2007). 
Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) proposed a bargaining solution in 
static models under such situations互Thisis a natural extension of the 
Nash bargaining solution with many agents where the decreasing 
marginal return technology is critical. They obtained a simple, closed-
form solution, which can be applied to many economic situations. They 
further showed that the equilibrium allocation is never efficient because 
the firm has an incentive to overemploy workers. By employing a greater 
number of workers, the marginal productivity of each worker falls under 
the decreasing marginal return technology, thereby reducing the 
contribution of each worker to production. As a consequence, the firm 
can reduce the bargaining power of workers by employing more workers 
than the socially optimal level. 
Although they focus on partial equilibrium models without labor 
markets outside the firm, the general equilibrium aspects of these 
models were also explored by Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer 
(2001), and Cahuc et al. (2004).4 These studies introduced a search 
1 From the first-order condition of capital, R=FK(K,L)=凡(k,1), where R is the rental rate of capital. 
2 Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) avoided the issue of a bargaining solution with decreasing marginal returns by 
introducing two sectors: the first is the sector for final goods where firms face decreasing marginal revenue, 
and the second is the sector for intermediate goods where the production function is linear in labor input 
Under this decentralized version of the economy, employed workers only bargain over wages with the 
producers of intermediate goods whose technology is linear. Consequently, any complexity in the bargaining 
problem is missing 
3 Wolinsky (1996, 2000) considered the dynamic implications of this solution where the firm can adjust 
employment over time and showed that a variety of equilibria exist 
4 De Fontenay and Gans (2003) showed that firms underemploy workers when some external labor pool is 
?friction in the labor market to explicitly distinguish between unemployed 
and employed workers. Smith (1999) showed that equilibrium allocation 
is never efficient, because itis distorted by the incentives of the firms to 
overemploy workers. In Smith's (1999) general equilibrium model, the 
firm makes two decisions: first, the optimal choice of job creation; 
second, the decision to enter the market. Smith (1999) showed that 
these decisions never lead to an efficient allocation in equilibrium. 
Under the decreasing marginal return technology, the firm has an 
incentive to overemploy workers, and, consequently, efficiency requires 
a low bargaining share of the firm so as to make job creation less 
profitable. This adjustment, however, reduces the incentive of the firm 
to enter the market, because profit is low when its bargaining share is 
small. Smith (1999) showed there is no level of bargaining share that 
leads to an efficient allocation. 
Although these studies are clearly suggestive, the workers are 
homogeneous in their models, and, as a consequence, job separation 
does not endogenously occur for workers whose productivity is relatively 
lower. The current study proposes a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with search frictions and heterogeneous workers, where the decision 
on job separation is critical. As noted, the previous literature investigates 
the efficient numbers of firms and the amount of job creation but not of 
job destruction in an environment where the decreasing marginal return 
technology is critical. 
A closed-form solution that includes heterogeneous workers is 
provided as an extension of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), Smith (1999), 
Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) and Bertola and Garibaldi (2001). 
Accordingly, this solution preserves similar properties to those of the 
standard job search models with homogeneous workers —including 
the Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value as special cases. The 
analysis provides a simple setup where the bargaining outcome in the 
literature can be applied in the case of heterogeneous workers. 
The present paper also reveals that efficient allocation is never 
achieved in equilibrium when heterogeneous workers exist because it 
requires an additional condition for job separation. As noted, Stole and 
available during the bargaining process, and consequently, the welfare results depend on whether the 
external labor pool is available. 
?Zwiebel (1996a) and Smith (1999) did not take the decision of job 
separation into consideration. In order to portray the relevance of 
heterogeneous workers, we first consider the case of homogeneous 
workers as the benchmark case. Under the assumptions in the present 
paper, efficient allocation is possible for some appropriate choice of 
bargaining share because itmakes the level of job creation efficient in 
equilibrium.5 In the case of heterogeneous workers, however, it is 
impossible to attain efficiency in equilibrium. This is because there are 
two distinct conditions for efficient job creation and job destruction when 
workers are heterogeneous. It is true that these two conditions are 
satisfied simultaneously in standard job search models without 
decreasing marginal return technology. As a result, efficiency can be 
attained if bargaining power is chosen appropriately. However, the 
introduction of decreasing marginal return technology and intrafirm 
bargaining violates this efficiency result. 
The current work is closely related to job search models, particularly 
those including the heterogeneity of jobs and endogenous job 
separation. Heterogeneity of jobs has been extensively studied in the 
job search models (Davis, 2001; Acemoglu, 2001; Cahuc et al., 2004). 
When firms create productive job openings (good jobs), they are unable 
to reap the benefits fully because parts of the benefits go to workers 
through negotiation after employment. They show that when the types 
of jobs are heterogeneous, a random matching model leads to an 
inefficient allocation in which there are too many job openings for less-
productive firms (bad jobs) in equilibrium. These results are clearly 
related to the present model. However, these models do not consider 
the effects of job separation, and this is the focus of the current paper. 
Moreover, we assume that workers (and hence, jobs) are identical 
when they are hired, and the quality of jobs is homogeneous in opening 
jobs. After they are employed, an exogenous productivity shock arrives 
for individual workers and endogenous job separation arises. 
The present paper clearly belongs to the job search literature with 
endogenous job destruction (Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Bertola and 
Garibaldi, 2001; Koeniger and Prat, 2007). Bertola and Caballero 
5 The decision on market entry, a critical factor in Smith (1999), is excluded so as to clarify the effect on the 
job separation decision 
?(1994) showed that the market equilibrium is unable to attain a social 
optimum when the productivity of firms is heterogeneous in job search 
models with decreasing marginal return technology. Cross-sectional 
differences in productivity across firms requires the adjustment of the 
behavior of individual firms differently in order to induce efficient job 
vacancies, but this is generally impossible. These models are clearly 
suggestive, but do not shed light on the role of job separation when 
there is a heterogeneity of workers within a firm. The present paper, on 
the other hand, provides a clear condition for efficient job separation, 
and inefficiency arises in equilibrium, even without heterogeneity across 
firms. 
There are many applications of job search models that employ the 
bargaining solution in the present paper where decreasing marginal 
return technology is critical. Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) investigated 
the effect of firm sizes on wages when the productivity of firms is 
heterogeneous and showed that wages are higher for larger firms 
because of the high level of productivity. Koeniger and Prat (2007) 
examined the effect of employment protection legislation in a model 
that includes job creation and destruction, along with free entry and exit 
conditions, although workers are homogeneous. Cahuc et al. (2004) 
studied the effect of heterogeneous workers and capital, but without 
endogenous job separation. Kudoh and Sasaki (2007) applied the 
bargaining solution to study working hours. The bargaining solution is 
also used in business cycle models such as those of Cheron and Langot 
(2000), Rotemberg (2006) and Krause and Lubik (2007). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the properties of the bargaining 
solution. Section 4 considers the welfare implications. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2 Model 
We assume a small open economy where firms and households 
can lend and borrow capital with a constant rental rater, and /3= (1 +r)一1
is the corresponding discount rate. We assume a discrete time model 
with search friction in the labor market. The measure of newly matched 
workers in each period is determined by the matching technology 
?μ(v尺uり， wherev町sthe measure of total vacancies in the market and 
uM is the measure of unemployed workers. We assume thatμis 
homogeneous of degree one with respect to臼 anduM. As a result, a 
worker (denoted by i) can find a job with probability of加=μ(v尺uり/UM.
On the other hand, the firm (denoted by j) can find the measure of 
workers by p戸μ(v尺uり／げwhenposting a unit measure of vacancies. 
By defining the tightness of 0=vM /u兄 thesetwo are Pw=q(0)0 and 
P7q(0), respectively, where q(0)=μ(1, 1/ 0). 
2.1 Firms 
We assume that a unit measure of firms exists, where each firm is 
denoted as a point on the unit interval on [ 0,1]. It is noted that firms 
cannot enter the market freely, unlike in Smith (1999). One firm employs 
many workers. Each worker has a weight of△ for a firm and we take the 
limiting case of△ → 0. Firmj announces the measure of job vacancies 
at the beginning of the period, which is denoted by v戸Accordingto the 
above matching technology, this firm can find q(()凰 measureof potential 
workers. When firm j announces vj vacancies, we have the following 
total vacancies in the market (げ）：
VM = fol Vj dj. (1) 
In order to create vj vacancies, the firm needs to pay the vacancy 
cost of cvj. It takes time to employ more workers because of search 
frictions, but the firm can fire workers immediately. We assume that the 
workers are fired before production takes place. Let nj and nj be the 
respective measures of employed workers before and after job 
destruction and these are related according to the following law of 
motion in employment: 
叫 ~nj, 叫=q(0)vj + (1 心ー）叫 (2) 
where心 isthe job separation rate for exogenous reasons and occurs 
at the end of each period. Here, n'is the employment level at the 
6 Note that the total number of job openings is Vj I△, since each worker has a weight of△ 
?beginning of the next period. 
The production function is a sum of two parts: a homogeneous part 
(af (nj)) and a heterogeneous part (lJi)-The homogeneous part is 
described by the standard production function and depends only on the 
number of workers (叩 andtechnology (a). In this expression, the 
technology of a represents an aggregate shock and we assume that it 
follows some Markov process. The production function is concave: 
f(O) =0, f'(月） >0, and f"(n) :s; o. 
Workers are heterogeneous in each firm. As a heterogeneous part 
of production, worker i produces an additional amount of lJi depending 
on the characteristics of worker i. For simplicity, lJi is drawn from the 
i.i.d. process across workers and time, and its distribution is G (1J) with 
support of (-00, +00) .7 As is made clear later in the paper, the optimal 
firing policy of firm j is to fire any workers whose lJi is below some 
critical value of防.Since high-ability workers (workers with high lJ) 
remain in the firm, the relation between initial employment (nj) and 
employment after job destruction (い is:
凡=G(山凡， (3) 
where G(1J) =1-G (1J). With this optimal job destruction rule, the total 
production of homogeneous and heterogeneous parts is: 
af(凡）+ nj /00 r;d G(r;) = af (凡）＋叫¥JI(リ］），
'!lJ 
where W is the average productivity of the workers after job destruction 
and 
J00 rJ d G(ry) 
w(TLj) = 均G(ry . 
-j 
Suppose that the firm, j, whose employment level is nj, observes a 
vector of the current aggregate variables of s at the beginnin釘 We
7 When the heterogeneous part of productivity is correlated over time, we need to include the skil distribution 
of workers as a state variable in the model. 
8 The shock of a is the only element of s, but many stochastic variables can be included in general. 
?assume that the firms and the workers decide their decisions only on 
the current state variables of (nj, s)亙Basedon this assumption, the 
firm's value function, denoted asf (nj,s), is characterized as follows: 
J(nj, s) = 
s.t. 
~3:x af仇）+ nj¥l(!l) -w(凡，S,!]_j)
Vj,nj,nj, 幻
-CVj + Es'ls J(叫，s')/3,(4) 
nj = q(0)vj + (1-c5w)nj, nj = c (!lj
凡三巧•
In the Bellman equation, w (尻s,!l)is the total wage that the firm 
pays al employed workers, and the amount is determined after optimal 
decisions of (vj, n 1,ij) are made.10 The wage depends on the number 
of workers仇）， thecritical quality of each worker (!J.J) as well as other 
aggregate state variables (s). In order to save on notation, it is convenient 
to focus on the wage rate of the worker with TJi=O. Then, by assuming 
the bargaining solution defined later, we can show that the wage rate 
for worker i, denoted as wr(n ,s, ry), is expressed as follows: 
研 (n,s,r;)=研(n,s,0)+呵， (5) 
where¢is the bargaining power of the workers. Intuitively, since the 
heterogeneous part of production (J) is additively separable, this part of 
the flow productivity is shared between the firm and the worker in the 
standard way. The total wage payment by the firm is: 
w(凡，s,!lj) 研（凡，s,0)元＋兄/07 d G (7), 
幻
研（凡，s,0)凡＋謹（叩叫 (6) 
9 Since this model has a structure of a game between the firm and many workers, optimal decisions should 
be dependent on the past entire history. In this sense, the strategy space is restricted to the stationary policy 
of Wolinsky (200) in the present model. 
10 Since we assume stationary policy, the bargained wage only depends on the current state variables. We 
also note that the wage (w) is also a function of the vacancies of Vj. However, we can ignore this effect in the 
current bargaining solution. This is because of the additive separability between vacancies and employment, 
and can be verified by direct calculation. 
，?
Under our assumption of unbounded support of 1, the solution is 
interior, thereby leading to endogenous job destruction in al cases (i.e., 
nj < nかInaddition, the following first-order conditions are obtained:11 
、?
?
? ー ー ?
???
? ??（（（?
C = q(0)Es'ls Jn(nj, s') /3, (7) 
aJ'(iij) -wr(iij,s,O) -w~(iij,s,O)iij・十 (1 -¢)!lj 
+(l -bw)Es'ls Jn(nj, s') (3 = 0,(8) 
(1-¢)(\JI(叩-叩 =(j• (9) 
Here, ぐjis a Lagrangean multiplier for the restriction of ij =G(叫n1,
andfn and u心 arethe partial derivatives of the value function and the 
wage rate with respect to employment. We can also get the following 
conditions from the optimality:12 
Jn(nj, s) =凶（リ)= (1 -¢) /0 [7 -!1) d G(7). 
附 (10) 
Note thatfn 2:'. 0 from the above expression. Intuitively, if fn <0, the 
firm will increase its value immediately by reducing the size of 
employment. 
2.2 Workers 
There is one measure of workers in the economy. The value function 
of the unit measure of unemployed workers is denoted as U(s) and 
depends on the aggregate state variables: 
U(s) = b + q(0)0[E; 1位，s'Jsmax(W(叫，s'屈），U(s'))](3 + (l -q(0)0)Es'Js U(s')/3, 
b + q(0)0[E; E77~,s'Js max(W(n1, s', 心―U(s'),o)]f3+E的sU(s')/3. (11) 
1 We use the fact that甲'(r,)=g(r,)/G(r,)('l'(r,)-r,) for rearranging the conditions. 
12 We can obtain this by taking the derivative of (4) with respect to nj. 
10 
Here the operator of E ¥ takes the weighted average: 
E万：・
V・ 
J J = I 巧•青dj.
J V 
The flow value of an unemployed worker is the sum of the constant 
unemployment benefit, b, and the discounted value of the expected 
benefits in the next period. The unemployed worker finds a job with 
probability q(0)0. When workers are employed, their value will be 
W(n',s',17'), which depends on the characteristics of the matched firms 
(n',s') as well as those of the worker (17'). The operator of E *j is necessary, 
since the unemployed worker does not know the future employer and 
is more likely to be matched with the firm posting more vacancies. 
The value of being employed in firmj is defined as Wand described 
in the following way under the stationary policy: 
W(nj,s叫＝研(nj,S叫+(1-心）Es', 叫[smax[ W(叫，s'叫 U(s')]/3 
十心Es'[sU(s') {3. (12) 
The value of employed workers is made up of the flow income of wr 
and the value in the next period. They are unemployed either when ry¥ 
is below the critical level of firing or when the exogenous shock arrives 
with probability心 inthe next period. 
2.3 Negotiation 
After the size of vacancies (v j and the optimal level of job destruction 
(n「fijare determined, fij surviving workers and the firm bargain over 
wages. We assume that negotiation starts after job destruction is 
completed but before production starts.13 In this model, since each 
worker has a weight of△, the total measure o仇 workerscorresponds 
to N workers where N呵／△い Wealso define the set of the employed 
workers by Cw={l,2,3, …，N}. 
We employ the bargaining solution developed by Stole and Zwiebel 
(1996a) where a firm bargains withNworkers. This is a simple extension 
13 This is the natural timing of negotiation since renegotiation can occur at any time before production starts 
in the model and binding contracts are not available 
14 Clearly, we ignore the integer problem by assuming that△ is chosen appropriately. 
1 
of the Nash bargaining solution to the multiple worker case. The firm 
bargains with the workers individually. The firm starts bargaining with 
worker 1. If they reach agreement, then the firm negotiates with worker 
2. This process continues until worker N as long as they reach 
agreement. However, if bargaining fails with worker i, then this worker 
leaves the firm, and the remaining N-1 workers and the firm start 
bargaining again. In this case, the firm needs to renegotiate with worker 
1. When al of the workers and the firm reach agreement, the wages 
are paid according to the agreement. 
For each bargaining stage, we use the following Nash bargaining 
solution between the firm and worker i: 
Assumption 1 (Bargaining solution) 
り（△iJ(n, s, rJi) = (1 — c/>)(W(n,s,rJ』- U(s))△ for al n :s;叫 (13)
Here,¢is the bargaining power of the worker. 
In the Nash bargaining solution, the threat point of this worker is 
U(s)△， because he/she will be unemployed when bargaining fails to 
reach agreement. Thus, the net increase in the present value from 
employment is (W(n,s,11i)-U(s))△ . On the other hand, the firm loses△ 
labor inputs whose quality is lJi△, when the worker leaves the firm. The 
net change in the firm's present value is denoted byムJ(n,s,71).This 
assumption requires that the total gain from the match is proportionately 
split between the firm and the worker. Although the foundation of the 
strategic bargaining game is possible旦wefollow Wolinsky (2000) and 
assume the surplus split rule as an axiom. 
Note that this condition must hold for al n that are less than幻 This
is because, when the firm and worker i fail to reach agreement, the 
number of the remaining workers becomes N-1 whose measure is n心
On this off-the-equilibrium path, the firm and the remaining N-1 workers 
bargain over wages. The bargaining outcome of this stage also depends 
on the threat point of firms, which is](か2△,s), because the number of 
the remaining workers is N-2 when bargaining fails. This process 
15 A few examples are shown in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Wolinsky (1996). 
12 
continues to the zero employment level. In this sense, we need to 
calculate J(n,s) for al n :;ij and the bargaining solution of (13) must 
hold for al possible values of n that are less than幻
The gain from bargaining for the firm, △ i J (n,s,JJi), is obtained from 
the definition of J in (4) by changing the measure of workers of quality 
lJi by△, but keeping the other variables of凪 Vj,and n constant. 16 After 
substituting equation (6) into this condition, we have: 
ふJ(n,s,叫=af(n)-af(n —•) ＋りt△
-(研(n,s, 0) n -wr(n —•, s,O) (n —•) ＋い）
+Es'lsド(q(翫+(1 -i5w)n, s') -J(戦）Vj + (1-6w)(n -△），s')] (3. 
- aJ'(n)△ —（研(n,s, 0) + w~(n, s, 0い）△+ (1-</>)rJi△ 
+(1 -t5w) E的sJn(n',s') /3△ . (14) 
Here, n'= q(0) Vj + (1-Jw) n. The equality holds when we take the 
limit of△ → 0. 
In order to derive a tractable bargaining solution, Assumption 1 is 
important, but it is not sufficient in the dynamic context. The following 
property is crucial. 
Lemma 1 Fora/I (n, 0, v) j ands, wehaveJn(n',s')△ =E叫ふJ(n',s', 州），
where n'=q (0)v1・+(l-6w)n. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
In general, the marginal gain from one worker (~if (n,s,rJi)) is different 
from the marginal benefit of employing one worker,fn(n, s). This lemma, 
however, shows that these two coincide in the next period, thereby 
leading to the simplified bargaining solution.17 
16 In the negotiation stage, firms already determine these variables. 
17 Note that this relation does not hold in the current period. In the current period, some workers already leave 
the firm after some rounds of negotiation off the equilibrium path, and the remaining number of workers is 
fewer than the number initially employed. Since the firm determines the posted number of vacancies (vj) and 
the critical level of job destruction位） before the negotiation starts, the envelope theorem fails to hold in this 
out-of-equilibrium path in the current period. But because the workers and the firm behave optimally in the 
next period and thereafter, even in the off-the-equilibrium path, we can apply the envelope theorem for the 
13 
In order to derive the explicit form of the bargaining solution, we first 
show that the value of being unemployed is rearranged as follows from 
(7), (11), and (13): 
¢ 
U(s) -Es'[s U(s') /3= b + C 0. 
1-¢ (15) 
We compare the two equations of (12) and (14) by substituting the 
above expression: 
q> 
(1-¢)(W(n,s,T/i) -U(s))△ = (1-¢)(研(n,s,0)-b-cl-c/>0)△+¢(1 -</>)T/i△ 
+(1-¢)(1-8w)Es',1J;ls max[ W(n',s',TJD -U(s'),O]f3△， 
¢△ i J(n, s, TJ』土叫J'(n)-wr (n, s, 0) -w~(n, s, O)n)△ 
＋り(1-り）T/i△ + c/>(1 -bw) Es'ls ln(n', s') (3△． 
The left-hand sides of the above two equations are the same by 
Assumption 1, and the last terms on the right-hand sides are identical 
by Lemma 1: 
cfaJn(n', s')6 = cpE'T/~6i J(n', s', TJD = (1-cp)E'T/~max[ W(n', s'叫— U(s'),o]△． 
After subtracting the two equations, we have the following differential 
equation by taking the limit of△ → 0: 
¢ 叫J'(n) —研 (n,s, 0) -n吋(n,s,o)]= (1 -¢) [研(n,s, 0) -b -C 0 , 
1ーの］
for al n~ 妬・
Although the model includes heterogeneous workers and several 
control variables, the bargaining solution stil retains the desirable 
property in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), Smith (1999) and Cahue and 
Wasmer (2001) in the sense that the future value functions do not affect 
the current wage level. 
By imposing the terminal condition, 18 this differential equation has 
next period and thereafter. 
18 The firm pays no wage payment when there is no worker. This is expressed as 
limv→ o wr(v,s, 0) v = 0.That implies limv→ o wr(v,s, O) v11¢= 0 for 0嗜 <1
14 
the following solution: 
1 n り 1
研 (n,s, O)n¢= lo ザ(v)v¼-ldv + (lーり）(b+c1_/)n¢ ・ (16) 
Although this formula is standard in the literature, we show that the 
solution is robust under general conditions with heterogeneous 
workers. 
The above wage equation is especially simple when we assume the 
constant elasticity production function of /=a n凡
研 (n,s, 0) a anaー1+(1-¢)(b+c¢
1-¢ 
0), 
研 (n,s,rJ)
1 1 a『(n)+ (1-¢)(b+c1: /), 
叫ハ、,af'(n)+ (1-¢)(b+c1: /) +呵 (17)
Once we know the wage rate, the value functions can be derived 
immediately. Although it is not necessary, we assume a symmetric 
equilibrium in the following analysis. By rearranging the first-order 
conditions of the firms, (7) -(10), with the solution of w, (16), we have 
the set of the conditions for the symmetric equilibrium: 
C = (1 -cp)q(0)E /0 (r,'-!l') G(dr,') /3, 
'2 (18) 
(1 -4>) C'―¢点.ra『 (v)vデ心— b+'.I.) + c(l -liw -<f,0q(0)) = O 
o q(0)'(19) 
where !l, n', and n follow the constraints: 
ii= Gり）n, n'= q(0)v + (1 ふーけi, 0= V 1-n・ (20) 
Definition 1 (Symmetric equilibrium) A symmetric equilibrium is an 
allocation of (nt+z,fit,!lt,l九Vt)fort=0,1,2, .. that satisfies (18), (19), and 
(20), given the initial value of n。・
15 
3 Properties of the Equilibrium 
The basic properties in the model are the same as in Stole and 
Zwiebel (1996a), Smith (1999) and Cahue and Wasmer (2001). First, 
this bargaining outcome preserves the important feature of search 
equilibrium, in the sense that the surplus is shared between the workers 
and firms. Second, the wage rate coincides with the standard result of 
the Nash bargaining solution, when the marginal return is constant.19 
However, as equation (17) indicates, the worker gets more than¢of 
the marginal product when a<l (the case of decreasing marginal 
return). This is because of the interactions in productivity between 
workers, and the intuition is the same as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a): 
when one worker leaves the firm, the remaining workers have more 
bargaining power because marginal productivity increases. Thus, 
employment of this worker contributes to production, as well as to 
reducing the bargaining power of the remaining workers. This additional 
benefit is shared between the worker and the firm and is why the shared 
fraction is greater than¢. 
Third, this bargaining outcome achieves the Shapley value when 
¢=0.5. This is an extension of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) to a model 
with heterogeneous workers. In order to show this equivalence, we 
consider the coalitional game of one firm and workers whose size is幻
As assumed before, this corresponds to N』瓜workers,each of whom 
has a weight of△ . They bargain over the total present value of surplus, 
assuming that the workers and the firm choose the optimal strategies 
in the future. Denote the set of workers by Cw={l,2, …，N}, the value of 
worker i by W汽(Cw,S,7Ji)△， andthe value of the firm by J5(cw, s), where 
cw C Cw. It is well known that the Shapley value is characterized by the 
balanced contributions property (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 
291). In the current model, this property is defined as follows. 
Definition 2 (Balanced contributions property) For any cw C Cw 
and i,l E Cw, 
19 We can confirm this equivalence by imposing a=l in (17). See Pissarides (2000) for the solution in the 
standard job search model. 
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J. JS (Cw, S) -J汀心¥i, S) = (W{ (Cw, S, T/i) -U (S))△． 
2. ~ 〉(Cw'S'T/i)-~ ド（心¥l,s, T/i) =叩(Cw,s, TJt) -Wl汀心¥i,s, 叫
It is clear that the value functions of the present model satisfy this 
condition. 
Proposition 1 (Shapley Value) The value functions of Wand~if in 
(12) and (14) satisfy the balanced contributions property when炉0.5.
Hence, the wage equation achieves the Shapley value. 
Proof. Let us take any cw C Ci。anddenote its measure by nc. Then, 
We define JS and ws SO that JS(Cw,S) -]S(Cw ¥ i,S) =ふT(nc,S,rJi)and 
W汽(cw,S,rJi)= W(nc,S,rJi). The first condition of the balanced contributions 
property is directly satisfied by (13) whenか0.5.The second condition 
is derived as follows: 
応(cw,s,77』-~汽心¥l,s, rJi) 
Q.E.D. 
4 Welfare 
W(nc, s, 0) -W(叩—△， s,0), 
W汽Cw,S,rJリ—的（心\i,s, 叫
The efficiency of the equilibrium is investigated in this section. 
Welfare is affected by two decisions made by the firm: namely, decisions 
on job creation and decisions on job destruction. In order to isolate the 
job creation decision, we first consider the model of homogeneous 
workers and then investigate the case of heterogeneous workers. We 
focus on the steady states where a and s are constant. 
4.1 Homogeneous workers 
When the workers are homogeneous, there is no endogenous job 
destruction in the steady state, thereby leading to a variant of Smith 
(1999), although there is no free entry condition in the present model. 
We show that the allocation is efficient in equilibrium when the bargaining 
share is chosen appropriately so that the firms choose efficient job 
creation levels. The modified version of the firm's value function, (4), is 
described as follows: 
J(nj,s) 
s.t. 
max af(nj) -w(nj, s, 0) -cvj + J(nJ, s') /3, 
Vj, 叫
叫=q(0)町+(1-心）nj, 
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(21) 
(22) 
where w (n1,s,O) is defined in (16). Under the steady state, the first-
order condition is described as follows in the symmetric equilibrium: 
c(r + bw +¢0q(0)) 
q(0) 
(1¢) ( 
i―点
一 Tfa『(v)vデ心— b),
-
(1-<P)(a『(i)-b -ii—¼f af"(v)げむ）"(23) 
We use integration by parts for the second equality. This optimal 
condition corresponds to the equilibrium conditions of (19) in the case 
of heterogeneous workers. Since there is no endogenous job separation 
in the homogeneous case, we have only one equilibrium condition for 
job vacancies. This equation, together with the law of motion of 
employment in the steady state (i.e., 0 = q(0) 0 (1-n) -c5 n), determines 
the equilibrium level of (n,0). 
The efficient condition is derived by solving the planner's problem. 
Under the symmetric assumption that al firms start with the same initial 
employment level of n, the planner solves the following problem:20 
max 
Vt,nt十1
+oo 
こ叫f(nt) - C巧十b(l-nt)], 
t=O 
s.t. nt+1 = q(0t加+(1-心）nt, 
n。isgiven. 
(24) 
The optimal conditions are described as follows in the steady 
state: 
20 Note that we assume that the planner uses the same employment strategies for al firms, which is optimal, 
because of the concave technology of my model. 
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c(r + 6w十 E0q(0))
=(1-E)(a『(v)-b), (25) 
where E isthe absolute value of the elasticity of q with respect to 0 (i.e., 
E=-q'(0) 0/ q(0)). 
Hosios (1990) showed that the equilibrium is efficient when the 
bargaining power of workers (¢)is equal to the elasticity of the matching 
function (E). After comparing (23) and (25), this is not clearly true in the 
present model. When </J=E, the left-hand side of (23) is smaller when 
the allocation (n,0) is efficient because of the concavity of the production 
function (f'(n) <0). Efficiency is, however, achieved in equilibrium by 
the appropriate choice of¢. 
Proposition 2 (Homogeneous Workers)日ficientallocation is 
achieved in equilibrium with some level of bargaining power (炉が），
where¢ ら€
Proof. In equation (23), suppose that n and 0 are the efficient levels 
to satisfy (25). Then, ifか1,the left-hand side of (23) is greater. If¢=E, 
the left-hand side is smaller because of the efficiency condition. By 
continuity, there is a point to satisfy this equation. By construction, this 
point is greater than E. Q.E.D. 
This efficiency result is the same as the job search models that 
include decreasing marginal return technology (Bertola and Caballero, 
1994, for example). The firm has an incentive to overemploy workers in 
order to reduce the bargaining position of the employed workers. 
Because of this additional effect in creating job vacancies, the bargaining 
share of the firms, 1-¢, should be set lower than the standard Hosios 
condition, i.e., 1-¢=1-E, in order to reduce the incentive to open job 
vacancies. 
4.2 Heterogeneous workers 
When workers are heterogeneous, the firm needs to make two 
decisions on job creation and destruction. Even in this case, the Hosios 
condition (¢ 弐） is enough to simultaneously satisfy the two efficiency 
conditions in job search models with heterogeneous workers (Pissarides, 
19 
2000). We show, however, that it is not true in the present model, and 
the efficiency result always fails to hold. 
For this purpose, consider the planner's problem when the workers 
are heterogeneous. The planner chooses the optimal job destruction 
（リ） as well as the job creation (v): 
max 
1J ,vt,nt,nt十1
—t 
+oo 0 
こ叫!(叫+nt rJ d G (rJ)-c灼+b(l -iit)' 
t=O J!lt ］ 
(26) 
s.t. nt十1= q(0t)灼+(1-心）hぃ幻=G(!Lt)nt, 
．． 
n0 1s given. 
The optimal conditions are described as follows in the steady 
state: 
C = (1-c)q(0) /0 (r;-りdG(r;) /3, 
'!l 
(1 -E) (a j'(Tl) -b +り＋c(l -6w -c0q(0)) 
q(0) 
(27) 
= 0. (28) 
When we compare these efficiency conditions with those in the 
equilibrium of (18) and (19), the following proposition is immediate: 
Proposition 3 (Heterogeneous Workers) The efficient allocation is 
never achieved in equilibrium when f'(n) <0. 
In order to understand this fact, note that the first conditions of both 
allocations are identical if E=¢, i.e., when the Hosios condition holds. 
However, with this bargaining power, the second equations of the two 
allocations never coincide, because (19) is modified in the following 
way: 
20 
O = (1-4>)(~r a『(v)vデ dv-b+り+c(l -心二、<p0q(0))
¢0' 
(1-</>)(a『(i)-ii—¼/'af"(v)v¼dv -b +り＋ c(l -Ow —¢0q(0)) 
Since the firm has an incentive to overemploy workers, smaller 
bargaining power should be given to firms to reduce the incentives of 
overemployment. However, the first equation that regulates job 
separation is violated in this case. The modified Hosios condition is not 
enough to satisfy the two conditions simultaneously. This efficiency 
result stands in contrast with standard job search models with 
heterogeneous workers. 
5 Conclusion 
We study a general equilibrium search model when a firm employs 
many heterogeneous workers and decreasing marginal returns exist in 
the technology. We generalize the bargaining solution in Stole and 
Zwiebel (1996a), Smith (1999) and Cahue and Wasmer (2001) to the 
model with heterogeneous workers. Although the model includes 
heterogeneous workers, the wage equation is stil simple and tractable. 
This solution retains several desirable properties, including the 
equivalence to the Shapley value. In addition, the separation decision 
is natural since the separation is made when the present value of the 
surplus is negative. In this sense, it is especially useful in the study of 
endogenous job separation under various environments. 
The endogenous job separation provides an additional condition for 
efficiency. Without job separation, efficient allocation is possible in 
equilibrium with a modified Hosios condition where the bargaining 
share is chosen appropriately to achieve the efficient amount of job 
creation. When heterogeneity is introduced among workers, job 
separation arises endogenously, and any equilibrium does not achieve 
efficient allocation. Although efficiency requires both efficient job 
separation and job creation conditions, these are not satisfied 
simultaneously in the present model, because of the interactions 
between workers within a firm. Endogenous job separation provides 
an additional source of inefficiency. 
21 
Whenever we study a situation where heterogeneous workers 
interact inside the firm, the standard job search model should be 
modified. This modification is not easy, since we explicitly need to 
consider the consistent bargaining solution inside the firm. The present 
model provides a tractable framework for studying the implications of 
endogenous job separation. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
In the bargaining stage, (vj, !]j, り isalready determined. Suppose 
that the employment level of the firm is n ,where n :;fij. When n < fij, 
some workers already leave the firm due to the failure of negotiation. 
First, we calculate the expected gain from bargaining in the next period, 
i.e.,EIJ△ i J(n',s',11/). The firm and the workers assume that they behave 
optimally in the next period, in the sense that the firm will make the 
optimal choices of (v/, 拡町）， giventhe state of (n',s', 州） • In addition, 
they assume that there will be no separation during the bargaining 
stage when 11'j~ 尻 inthe next period: 
00 
E凸 J(n',s', 77~) = j [a『国）△-(研（尻，s',0) -w~(尻， s',0)尻＋呵）△
閏
心+(1-心）Es" Is'ln (n", s")饂]d G(77D, 
(1-り）(詞—嗚] dG(叫）△．
In order to obtain the second equation, we use the fact that the firm 
makes the optimal decision in the next period. We can thus apply the 
first-order conditions of (8) in the next period. Therefore, E心iJ(n',s', 州）
=fn(n',s')△ by (10). Q.E.D. 
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